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ABSTRACT
This study argues that both unequal opportunity and social mobility are necessary implications of
an eﬃcient societal arrangement when incentives must be provided.
∗The author thanks Marco Bassetto, V. V. Chari, Narayana Kocherlakota, Aleh Tsyvinski, and Ivan Werning
for helpful comments. The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction
The fact that the children of rich parents have better economic prospects than the
children of poor parents (“unequal opportunity”) is generally thought to be one of the weak
points of modern capitalist societies. The ability of the descendants of poor families to
eventually become rich and the descendants of rich families to eventually become poor (“social
mobility”) is commonly considered to be one of the strong points of these societies. Here I
argue that both of these characteristics are, in fact, necessary implications of an eﬃcient
societal arrangement when incentives to work hard must be provided.
I argue this point using a generational version of the model of Phelan and Townsend
(1991), an inﬁnitely repeated, general equilibrium economy with incentive constraints. In my
model, each household’s stochastic output is a function of its level of eﬀort. Since eﬀort is
assumed to be costly and privately observed (households can shirk), higher than minimal eﬀort
levels must be induced by making a household’s present or future consumption dependent on
the household’s observed output history.
A large literature considers models similar to this (including Green (1987), Atkeson
and Lucas (1992), Phelan (1994, 1995), Wang (1995), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), and
Khan and Ravikumar (2002)). The main diﬀerence between the economies in that literature
and here is that here, instead of a household consisting of a single inﬁnitely lived individual,
a household consists of a sequence of altruistically linked individuals (a familial dynasty),
each of whom lives for one period.
This diﬀerence aﬀects the appropriate societal ranking of allocations. When house-
holds consist of a single inﬁnitely lived individual, allocations can be ranked according to their
implied distributions of ex ante lifetime utilities. (If one allocation delivers a distribution ofex ante utilities dominated by another allocation, then the ﬁrst allocation is ineﬃcient.)
However, if a household consists of a sequence of altruistically linked individuals, then the
appropriate ranking of allocations is no longer obvious. How those in the ﬁrst generation
rank allocations will, in general, diﬀer from how their descendants rank allocations.
This study addresses this conﬂict between generations by ranking allocations according
to a Rawlsian veil-of-ignorance criterion (Rawls (1971)). That is, here, society seeks to
maximize the expected dynastic utility (utility including altruism toward descendants) of
an individual who does not know into which generation he will be born and does not know
the identity or output levels of his ancestors.1 I argue that this corresponds to a societal
ranking which does not discount the future even though individuals in the society at any
given time do discount it. I show this ranking transforms the social planning problem into
one of directly choosing the stationary distribution of dynastic utilities, as well as functions
for determining eﬀort levels, consumption, and a child’s position in this distribution as a
function of his parent’s output. This transformed problem is a static social choice problem
and thus a major simpliﬁcation.
An immediate result of this societal ranking of allocations (zero discounting) is that
eﬃciency immediately implies a ﬁnite amount of inequality in the limit. That is, in previ-
ous papers such as Atkeson and Lucas (1992) (which rank allocations according to their ex
ante lifetime utilities), eﬃciency implies inequality grows over time without limit. Limited
resources, concave utility, and forever growing inequality imply that mean utility is forever
decreasing. Thus while optimal from an ex ante perspective, an allocation with forever grow-
1Freeman and Sadler (2002) use a similar objective function. They consider whether an optimal policy
can be decentralized through inheritances.
2ing inequality is not only not eﬃcient, but in fact, the worst one can do if, as in this paper,
society does not discount. (Papers subsequent to this paper by Farhi and Werning (2005) and
Sleet and Yeltekin (2005) generalize this result. That is, they show a much weaker assump-
tion than zero societal discounting is suﬃcient to ensure ﬁnite limiting inequality. Essentially,
they show that as long as the societal ranking puts greater weight on future generations than
that implied by the altruism of the ﬁrst generation, ﬁnite limiting inequality will hold.)
My ﬁrst main theorem is that a society using this ranking will always choose the
distribution of dynastic utilities to be nondegenerate; in other words, it will choose unequal
opportunity. Some individuals will be born relatively poor (fated to receive relatively low
consumption for each output realization), and some will be born relatively rich, even though
equal opportunity is feasible. This occurs because it helps with the provision of incentives to
make a child poorer if his parent realizes a low output level and richer if his parent realizes
a high output level. This, in a sense, extends the result of Rogerson (1985) to a generation
context.
My second main theorem, subject to a condition which can be proved for speciﬁc
functional forms for utility, is that society will choose to have social mobility. It will never
choose to have a caste system with one group of families having relatively high average
consumption and another having relatively low consumption and with no ability for a family
to move between groups. Instead, no matter how poor or rich a parent is, eventually, the
expected consumption of that person’s descendants equals the unconditional expectation.
The basic intuition behind the ﬁrst result, unequal opportunity, is that there is zero
loss, at the margin, from allowing some dependence of a child’s consumption on his parent’s
output realization. However, a positive marginal beneﬁt results from relaxing the incentive
3constraints on parents by making a child’s future consumption depend on his parent’s output
realization. The basic intuition behind the second result, social mobility, is that a society
with multiple castes simply requires more resources to deliver a given mean utility than a
single caste society.
After stating and proving these main theoretical results for a general, additively sep-
arable utility function, I discuss speciﬁc functional forms for utility and computation. Next
I show that computation of the optimal stationary distribution of dynastic utilities (along
with the functions determining consumption and mobility) consists of solving a single linear
program. Finally, I present a computed example and compare it to the static optimum and
the optimal allocation when allocations are ranked by ex ante utility, as opposed to limiting,
dynastic utility.
At the end, I discuss the generality of these results. I argue that my results do not
depend on the particular type of incentive problem discussed here (unobserved eﬀort). My
results can apply to unobserved endowment models such as that of Green (1987), unobserved
preference shock models such as that of Atkeson and Lucas (1992), and unobserved production
models such as that of Khan and Ravikumar (2002).
2. The Basic Model
Consider the following economy. In each time period, t ∈ {0,...,∞}, the economy
is populated by a unit mass continuum of identical, inﬁnitely lived households. There is a
single consumption good. If a household exerts an eﬀort level a ∈ A = {a0,...,aN}, then its
output (in terms of the consumption good) q ∈ {q0,...,qM} occurs with probability P(q|a).
Assume that P(q|a) > 0 for all (q,a) ∈ Q × A and that there exists (q,q) ∈ Q2 such that
4if ai < aj, then P(q|ai) < P(q|aj) and P(q|ai) > P(q|aj). That is, the probability of one
outcome (say, the highest) is increasing in a, and the probability of another outcome (say,
the lowest) is decreasing in a. Households are assumed to be able to privately exert eﬀort
less than that speciﬁed by the allocation. That is, they can shirk.
Household utility in period t is determined by the function U(ct,at) = u(ct) − v(at),
where ct ∈ C is the household’s period t consumption. (The consumption set C is assumed
convex.) The function u is assumed to be unbounded below, twice diﬀerentiable with u0 > 0
and u00 < 0. For ai < aj, v(ai) is assumed to be strictly less than v(aj). Over time and




β ∈ (0,1). Let V = {u(c) − v(a0)|c ∈ C}.






subject to a static resource constraint
X
q
P(q|a)(c(q) − q) ≤ 0
and the static incentive constraint (for ˆ a < a)
X
q
P(q|a)u(c(q)) − v(a) ≥
X
q
P(q|ˆ a)u(c(q)) − v(ˆ a).
5A. Dynamic Allocations
Let a dynamic allocation (or simply an allocation) (Ψ0,{at(wt),ct(wt,qt),
wt+1(wt,qt)}∞
t=0) be deﬁned recursively as a measure of initial lifetime utilities, Ψ0, and a
sequence of functions at(wt), ct(wt,qt), and wt+1(wt,qt). The function at(wt) speciﬁes the
recommended eﬀort level for a household which starts period t with a continuation expected
utility of wt. The function ct(wt,qt) speciﬁes the nonnegative consumption of a household
which starts period t with a continuation expected utility of wt and realizes output qt. The
function wt+1(wt,qt) speciﬁes the continuation expected discounted utility at the beginning
of period t + 1 of a household which starts period t with a continuation expected utility of
wt and realizes output qt.
Note that through the initial distribution of forward-looking utilities Ψ0, and the func-
tions at(wt) and wt+1(wt,qt), an allocation determines, for all t ≥ 1, the period t distribution
of forward-looking utilities Ψt.






(1 − β)[u(ct(wt,qt)) − v(at(wt))] + βwt+1(wt,qt)

.
In words, promise-keeping requires that expected dynastic utility of an allocation conditional
on wt is actually wt. Next, an allocation is said to be incentive-compatible if, for all t, wt,






(1 − β)[u(ct(wt,qt)) − v(ˆ a)] + βwt+1(wt,qt)

.
6Here, the left side is the dynastic utility associated with taking action at(wt), and the right
side is the dynastic utility associated with taking an alternative action ˆ a < at(wt). Finally,






P(q|at(wt))[c(wt,q) − q] dΨt(wt).
Condition (3) requires that aggregate production be weakly greater than aggregate consump-
tion. A dynamic allocation is considered feasible if it satisﬁes all three of these conditions
(1)–(3).2
B. Ranking Feasible Allocations
In most dynamic contracting work, a household consists of a single inﬁnitely lived
individual who discounts the future by β.3 Given this, an allocation is considered eﬃcient if
it is feasible (satisﬁes promise-keeping, incentive-compatibility, and resource-feasibility) and
if no other feasible allocation delivers a distribution of initial utilities which dominates Ψ0.
In models similar to this one, Atkeson and Lucas (1992) and Phelan (1994) derive
several implications of this type of eﬃciency. First, these studies show that an eﬃcient
allocation must, household by household, minimize the discounted resource cost of delivering
a given ex ante utility w0 and that this resource cost is a convex function of w0. Thus, a
society maximizing mean ex ante utility would choose a degenerate measure of initial utilities
2The recursive formulation also requires a no-Ponzi scheme condition to ensure that arbitrarily high
dynastic utilities are not delivered by promising ever higher future dynastic utilities. One suﬃcient condition
is that for all t, mean dynastic utility be weakly less than u(qM) − v(a0), the utility of every day consuming
the highest output level and taking the lowest eﬀort.
3See Green (1987), Phelan and Townsend (1991), and Atkeson and Lucas (1992) among many others. An
exception is Freeman and Sadler (2002).
7Ψ0 with all mass on the same point.4 Second, these studies show that eﬃciency, by this
deﬁnition, implies extreme results regarding the limiting distribution of consumption and
utility. In the model of Atkeson and Lucas (1992), almost all consumption paths go to zero,
and mean utility goes to the lower bound of the set of possible utilities (either zero or negative
inﬁnity, depending on the level of risk aversion). In the model of Phelan (1994), the variance
of consumption grows without bound, and thus mean utility becomes inﬁnitely negative.
Here I consider a diﬀerent ranking of allocations, supported by the following assump-
tion. Instead of a household consisting of a single inﬁnitely lived individual, suppose that a
household consists of a sequence of altruistically linked individuals, each of whom lives for
one period. Speciﬁcally, assume that the dynastic utility of an individual born in period t
consists of weight 1−β on his own direct utility U(ct,at) and weight β on the dynastic utility




P(qt|at(wt))[(1 − β)U(ct(wt,qt),at(wt)) + βwt+1(wt,qt)].
(This is equivalent to the individual putting weight 1 − β on his own direct utility, weight
β(1 − β) on his child’s direct utility, β
2(1 − β) on his grandchild’s, and so on.) With this
composition of households, the set of feasible allocations is identical to that which holds if
households consist of a single inﬁnitely lived individual. However, the appropriate ranking of
allocations is no longer obvious. Maximizing ex ante dynastic utility puts no direct weight
on the utility of generations born later than period t = 0. These later generations enter the
4Ranking allocations by mean ex ante utility is equivalent to maximizing the utility of a household which
does not know where in distribution Ψ0 it will be, but instead sees itself as having the same probability as
all other households of being in any subset of the support of Ψ0.
8social calculus only indirectly, through the altruism of those born in period t = 0. Pareto
eﬃciency, rather than putting all weight on the ﬁrst generation, would allow any arbitrary
weighting scheme across generations.
This paper considers an alternative extreme of equal weighting of all generations,
or, put diﬀerently, zero societal discounting. Formally, let vt =
R





t=0 vt.5 In words, vt is the average utility, including altruism toward chil-
dren, of individuals born in period t and v is the limiting average of this average over dates.
Instead of ranking allocations by v0, allocations can be ranked by v. Since the number of
periods is inﬁnite, such a weighting scheme puts zero weight on the ﬁrst T periods (regardless
of T). (Of course, one can admit intermediate weighting schemes where later generations have




tvt where δ < 1. Two recent papers by Farhi and Werning (2005)
and Sleet and Yeltekin (2005) build on this work and consider precisely this intermediate
case. )
It is useful to establish that a plan which maximizes limiting mean utility, v, minimizes
limiting mean resources. Attention will then be mostly restricted to cost minimizing, rather








P(q|at(wt))[c(wt,q) − q] dΨt(wt)




t=0 vt, but this limit may not exist. A standard
approach in game theory to implementing zero discounting is ranking by the liminf. (See Fudenberg and













t=0 vt subject to (1), (2), and (3). Call the






V w dΨt(w) and constraints (1)
and (2).
Lemma 1. If allocation ζ solves the primal problem with objective function value v, it solves
the dual problem with S(ζ) = 0 when limiting average utility must equal v.
(Proof relegated to Appendix.)
C. Stationary Allocations
Let a stationary allocation be deﬁned as a dynamic allocation where for all t and s,
(Ψt,at(w),ct(w,q),w0
t+1(w,q)) = (Ψs,as(w),cs(w,q),w0
s+1(w,q)). Alternatively, a stationary







0(w,q) ∈ W) dΨ(w),
where I(·) is the indicator function and B(V ) denotes the Borel subsets of V . Here, the left
side is the mass of households on set W today, and the right side is the mass of households
on set W tomorrow.










In words, condition (5) requires that the functions a(w), c(w,q), and w0(w,q) actually deliver
dynastic utility w.
A stationary allocation is considered incentive-compatible if for almost all w relative










As before, the left side is the dynastic utility of taking action a(w), and the right side is the
dynastic utility of taking alternative action ˆ a.






P(q|a(w))[c(w,q) − q] dΨ(w).
Call the stationary primal problem maxξ
R
V w dΨ(w) subject to (4)–(7). Call the




q P(q|a(w))[c(w,q)−q] dΨ(w) subject to (4)–(6) and the
mean utility constraint v ≤
R
V w dΨ(w).
The next lemma shows that without loss, attention can be restricted to stationary
allocations. This is a major simpliﬁcation since the stationary primal and dual problems
are static optimizations. The main idea behind the proof is that any dynamic allocation for
which Ψt does not converge can be used to create another dynamic allocation where Ψt does
11converge where the diﬀerence in cost between the two allocations is arbitrarily small. Once
attention can be restricted to allocations where Ψt converges, given zero discounting ranking
of allocations, restricting attention to stationary allocations is immediate.
Lemma 2. Suppose ξ = (Ψ,a(w),c(w,q).w0(w,q)) solves the stationary dual problem. Then
(Ψ0 = Ψ,{at(wt) = a(wt),ct(wt,qt) = c(wt,qt),w0
t(wt,qt) = w0(wt,qt)}∞
t=0) solves the dual
problem.
(Proof relegated to Appendix.)
3. Characterizing Optimal Allocations
This section presents the main results of the paper: unequal opportunity and social
mobility are necessarily characteristics of an optimal allocation. Showing this requires several
supporting lemmas (with again the proofs relegated to the appendix).
Lemma 3. If a stationary allocation ξ





q P(q|a∗(w))[c∗(w,q) − q] dΨ∗(w) = 0. Likewise, if stationary
allocation ξ
∗ =(Ψ∗,a∗(w),c∗(w,q),w0∗(w,q)) solves the stationary dual problem, then the
mean utility constraint v ≤
R
V w dΨ∗(w) holds as an equality.
Given that the resource constraint (7) binds in the stationary primal problem and the
mean utility constraint binds in the stationary dual problem, it is straightforward to show
that a plan which maximizes mean utility minimizes the cost of providing any given mean
utility, and vice versa. Thus, the second supporting lemma is the following.
Lemma 4. Suppose a stationary allocation ξ
∗ solves the stationary primal problem, and let
12v =
R
V w dΨ∗(w). Then ξ
∗ solves the stationary dual problem






P(q|a(w))[c(w,q) − q] dΨ(w)





with C(v) = 0. Likewise, if ξ
∗ solves the stationary dual problem with C(v) = 0, it solves
the stationary primal problem.
A. Opportunity
Lemma 4 allows for the ﬁrst main result, that an optimal plan will always exhibit
unequal opportunity. (Some individuals are born with lower expected dynastic utility than
others.) The general strategy of the proof is to assume that all incentives are static—that
all individuals are born with a blank slate—and show that the cost of introducing a small
amount of dependency of children’s consumption on parents’ outcomes is second-order, while
the beneﬁt, or gain, from this dependency (which allows for the better provision of incentives
to parents) is ﬁrst-order.
Theorem 1. Suppose ξ
∗ = (Ψ∗,a∗(w),c∗(w,q),w0∗(w,q)) solves the stationary dual problem.
Then Ψ∗ is nondegenerate.
Proof. The strategy of this proof is similar to that in Rogerson (1985): Suppose no
links across periods and show there exists an improving perturbation. (The model of this
13paper is suﬃciently diﬀerent from the model in Rogerson (1985) that this proof needs
a diﬀerent perturbation than that in Rogerson (1985).) To this end, suppose Ψ∗ is de-





. First, let Ψ put mass 1 − P(q|a∗) − P(q|a∗) on point w∗,
mass P(q|a∗) on point w = w∗ − /P(q|a∗), and mass P(q|a∗) on point w = w∗ + /P(q|a∗).
By construction, then
R
V w dΨ(w) =
R
V w dΨ∗(w) = w∗; thus, ξ satisﬁes condition (9) for
v = w∗. Next, assume for w ∈ {w,w∗,w} that a(w) = a∗. This ensures that aggregate
production is unchanged.
Next, let w0(w,q) = w, w0(w,q) = w, and for q / ∈ {q,q}, w0(w,q) = w∗. This
ensures (for all ) that stationarity (4) is satisﬁed. Lastly, deﬁne the functions c(w,q) for



























β)P(q|a∗)] + ∆(w,q). Since the original stationary allocation ξ
∗ is optimal, choosing  = 0
and ∆(w,q) = 0 for all (w,q) ∈ {w,w∗,w} × Q must minimize equation (8) subject to the
promise-keeping constraint (5) and the incentive-compatibility constraint (6).
Note that the incentive constraint associated with w = w∗ in this restricted optimiza-
tion problem binds; thus, the marginal value of loosening it is strictly positive. To see this,
consider choosing  and ∆(w,q) to minimize (8) subject to the promise-keeping constraint
(5) but not the incentive constraint (6). Here, I can strictly improve on ξ
∗ by setting  = 0
and setting ∆(w∗,q) such that c(w∗,q) =
P
q P(q|a∗)c∗(w∗,q) (full consumption insurance)
less a constant to compensate for the utility gain associated with full insurance. (Recall the
assumption that a∗ > a0. Thus, full consumption insurance is not attained by ξ
∗.)
14Now set ∆(w,q) = 0 for all (w,q). This ensures that the promise-keeping constraint
(5) holds for all . Thus, a choice of  6= 0 aﬀects only the incentive constraint (6) and the
dual objective function (8).
For w ∈ {w,w∗,w}, the derivative, with respect to , of the left side of the incentive
constraint minus the derivative of the right side equals β[P(q|ˆ a)/P(q|a∗) − P(q|ˆ a)/P(q|a∗)].
This derivative is a strictly negative constant (not a function of ) for all ˆ a < a∗, and thus,
the incentive constraint for each w is loosened as  increases.
Finally, let u−1(u) denote the consumption payment necessary to deliver utility u(c).














































































This derivative equals zero for  = 0. Thus, the marginal value of increasing  when  = 0 and
∆(w,q) = 0 is strictly positive since it loosens a binding constraint (a ﬁrst-order beneﬁt) with
zero ﬁrst-order eﬀect on the objective function, contradicting the optimality of the original
allocation.
15B. Social Mobility
Note that an allocation ξ =(Ψ,a(w),c(w,q),w0(w,q)) deﬁnes not only the distribution
of dynastic utilities, Ψ, but also the rules under which households move up or down this
distribution. Thus, the answers to questions regarding social mobility are embedded in ξ.
(Can the descendants of poor, or low w, households eventually become rich?) Now I consider
to what extent the eﬃciency of ξ implies social mobility. In particular, I argue that social
mobility is a direct implication of strict convexity of the cost function C(v).
To allow a strict deﬁnition of social mobility, let a set W ∈ B(V ) be called a caste







0(w,q) ∈ W) dΨ(w),
which implies a zero exit and entry probability from W. A caste W is called trivial (relative
to ξ) if Ψ(W) = 1, or if
R
W w dΨ(w) =
R
Wc w dΨ(w), where W c denotes the complement of
W. Thus, for a caste system to be nontrivial, its complement must have positive mass and
the mean utility of those in the caste must diﬀer from the mean utility of those outside the
caste.
My main theorem here is that if C(v) is strictly convex (a condition shown in the
next section for particular functional forms), then any caste system must be trivial. That is,
having a permanently richer group and a permanently poorer group is never optimal.
Theorem 2. Suppose C(v) is strictly convex and a stationary allocation ξ =(Ψ,a(w),c(w,q),
w0(w,q)) minimizes (8) subject to (4)–(6), and (9) for v =
R
w Ψw(w). Then any caste W
relative to ξ is trivial.
16Proof. Let W1 be a caste relative to ξ. If Ψ(W1) = 1, then the result is proved; thus, assume
that Ψ(W1) < 1. Let W2 = W c
1. Like W1, the set W2 is also a caste. Deﬁne two separate
allocations ξi, i ∈ {1,2}, by choosing Ψi such that for all W ⊂ Wi, Ψi(W) = Ψ(W)/Ψ(Wi)
and leaving the functions a(w), c(w,q), and w0(w,q) unaltered. (That is, proportionally
put all mass on one set or the other, but otherwise change nothing). These allocations
each satisfy promise-keeping and incentive-compatibility since the original allocation satisﬁes
these conditions, and each satisﬁes stationarity since W1 and W2 do not communicate and
the original allocation satisﬁed stationarity. Put less formally, the fact that the sets W1
and W2 don’t communicate implies that how those in each set are treated deﬁnes a feasible
allocation for treating all of society. Thus, each allocation must minimize (8) subject to
(4)–(6), and (9) for v = wi, where wi = [1/Ψ(Wi)]
R
V wdΨi(w), i ∈ {1,2}. If another
allocation satisﬁes (4)–(6) and (9) at a lower cost, then the original allocation ξ could not
have been optimal, since this lower cost allocation could have been incorporated into the





< Ψ(W1)C(w1)+Ψ(W2)C(w2). Since the right side of
this inequality is the resource cost of the original plan, w1 = w2.
4. Functional Forms
Here I introduce two explicit functional forms for U(c,a). These functional forms allow
me to solve for C(v) (up to a constant) and thus prove the strict convexity assumed by Theo-
rem 2. Further, they allow for a relatively complete characterization of the optimal allocation
when allocations are ranked by ex ante utility, as opposed to limiting, mean utility; they thus
help highlight the eﬀect of ranking allocations by the mean of the limiting distribution of
17dynastic utilities. While these examples are not additively separable (as the earlier sections
assumed), Lemmas 1 and 2 and Theorem 1 can be proved using arguments similar to those
used earlier.
The simplest example has U(c,a) = −exp(−γ[c−v(a)]) with consumption unbounded
(or c ∈ R) and γ > 0—the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility speciﬁcation
in Phelan (1994). Given this utility function and consumption set, Phelan (1994) shows
that if allocations are ranked by mean ex ante utility, optimality implies that at is constant
across households and time (thus, so is aggregate production), and household consumption
is the sum of an independent and identically distributed random variable and a term which
follows a driftless random walk. Since eﬀort is constant and utility is a concave function
of consumption, as the cross-sectional variance of consumption increases due to the random
walk term, mean dynastic utility decreases over time without bound. In essence, the optimal
allocation from an ex ante perspective implies a limiting distribution of dynastic utilities
which has all mass on negative inﬁnity. However, that’s the worst possible allocation when
allocations are ranked, as they are here, by the mean of the limiting distribution of dynastic
utilities. (Theorem 1 shows that a ﬁnite mean limiting utility can, in fact, be achieved, since
one can do better than repeating the static optimum, which itself has a ﬁnite mean utility.)
Assuming this speciﬁc functional form also allows me to show that C(v) is strictly
convex, as assumed by Theorem 2. This is shown in the following lemma:
Lemma 5. If U(c,a) = −exp(−γ[c − v(a)]) with c ∈ R and γ > 0, then for v < 0,






P(q|a(w))[c(w,q) − q] dΨ(w)
18subject to (4)–(6), and (9) satisﬁes C(v) = −log(−v)/γ +C(−1) and is thus strictly convex.
Proof. See the Appendix.
With some extension of the model, I can construct tractable example economies which
do not depend on CARA utility. In particular, following Atkeson and Lucas (1992), Khan
and Ravikumar (2002), and Phelan (2002), let household output equal kq, where k is the
quantity of land allocated to the household for use in production that period. Let v(a)
denote the per-acre utility loss to eﬀort, and thus, let kv(a) denote the total utility loss
to eﬀort a. Finally, let utility be the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) speciﬁcation
U(c,a,k) = [c − kv(a)]γ/γ, where γ = 0 implies that U(c,a,k) = log[c − kv(a)]. With this
speciﬁcation, if allocations are ranked by ex ante utility, almost all household consumption
paths converge to zero, the result of Atkeson and Lucas (1992) for a preference shock model.
This implies that the limiting distribution of dynastic utilities has either all mass on zero (for
the case of γ > 0) or all mass on negative inﬁnity (for the case of γ ≤ 0). Here, as in the
previous example, if allocations are ranked by the mean of the limiting distribution, analogs
of Lemmas 1 and 2 and Theorem 1 can be proved.
Introducing land to the model introduces an additional resource constraint into the
primal problem. Not only must society not allocate more of the consumption good than is
available from production, it must also not allocate more land to households than is exoge-
nously given. However, if society is assumed to be able to trade land for the consumption
good at a linear price p (which can be set equal to the ratio of the Lagrange multipliers as-
sociated with the separate resource constraints), then I can prove that C(v) is convex. This
is shown in the following lemma.
19Lemma 6. If U(c,a,k) = [c − kv(a)]γ/γ with c ≥ kv(a), then











subject to (4)–(6), and (9) satisﬁes C(v) = v1/γC(1) if γ > 0 (and thus v > 0), C(v) =
exp(v)C(0) if γ = 0, and C(v) = (−v)1/γC(−1) if γ < 0 (and, thus, v < 0). In each case,
C(v) is strictly convex.
Proof. See the Appendix.
5. Computation
My approach of directly choosing the stationary allocation simpliﬁes computation as
well. In particular, if Ψ is restricted to a ﬁnite support, then an optimal stationary allocation
can be computed as a single linear program along the lines of Prescott and Townsend (1984).
While the incentive constraints capture the dynamic decision of households, the choice of
how to organize society given those constraints is static; thus, dynamic programming along
the lines of Phelan and Townsend (1991) or Atkeson and Lucas (1992) is not needed.
The linear program is set up as follows. Let ˆ V ⊂ V be a ﬁnite grid of points in V
restricting the support of Ψ. Next, let ˆ C be a ﬁnite grid of points restricting the range of
c(w,q). (The function a(w) has already been assumed to have a ﬁnite range.) The key to
transforming the choice of the stationary allocation into a linear program is to combine the
measure Ψ (now restricted to a ﬁnite support) with the rules a(w), c(w,q), and w0(w,q).
That is, let µ(w,a,q,c,w0) be the fraction of households who start at point w ∈ ˆ V , receive
action recommendation a ∈ A, experience output realization q ∈ Q, get consumption level
20c ∈ ˆ C, and transit to point w0 ⊂ ˆ V .
Choosing µ(w,a,q,c,w0) for all (w,a,q,c,w0) ∈ ˆ V × A × Q × ˆ C × ˆ V pins down
(Ψ,a(w),c(w,q),w0(w,q)) if µ(w,a,q,c,w0) satisﬁes several linear conditions. First, the frac-






Next, the fraction of households which realize output q must coincide with the fraction
determined by the technology P(q|a). This can be enforced by requiring that Bayes’ rule
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The objective function, stationarity, the promise-keeping, incentive-compatibility, and
resource-feasibility constraints are, like the previous conditions, linear in the choice variables.






A collection µ(w,a,q,c,w0) is stationary if for all w ∈ ˆ V , the fraction of households at w is














0)[(1 − β)u(c,a) + βw
0 − w] = 0.



















0)(c − q) ≤ 0.
6. An Example
Now I present an example economy computed using the methods just outlined. For
this example economy, I also compute the solutions to the static optimum and the optimum
when allocations are ranked by ex ante dynastic utility and compare those solutions to that
when allocations are ranked by the mean of Ψ, the stationary distribution of dynastic utilities.
In the example, these are the parameter values used: a ∈ {0,1}, q ∈ {0,1}, β = 2/3,
and U(c,a) = −exp(−(c − 0.3a)). The high output (q = 1) occurs with probability 3/4 if
a = 1 and probability 1/4 if a = 0.6
6The parameters speciﬁc to the computation method are as follows: ˆ V = {−0.90,−0.88,..., −0.52,−0.50}
and ˆ C = {−0.20,−0.18,..., 1.02,1.04}. The program was written in C using the gnu compiler and the gnu
linear programming package. While the resulting linear program has 111,132 variables and 106 constraints,
it solves on an Apple 867MHz PowerBook G4 in under four minutes.
22Figure 1 displays Ψ, as well as the utility levels associated with the static optimum,
the mean of Ψ, and the dynastic utility of the ﬁrst generation when allocations are ranked
by their ex ante dynastic utility. (The ex-ante optimal allocation has a degenerate limiting
distribution with all mass at negative inﬁnity.)










Figure 1: The Distribution of Dynastic Utilities, Ψ.
Since the static optimum is a feasible but suboptimal stationary allocation, its value
is strictly lower than the mean of Ψ. Since the optimal stationary allocation is a feasible
allocation when stationarity is not imposed, the mean of Ψ is strictly lower than the utility
associated with the optimal ex ante allocation.
For all w in the support of Ψ, a(w) = 1. (Thus, this function is not graphed.) Fig-
ure 2 presents the function c(w,q). Not surprisingly, c(w,q) is increasing in both arguments.
Further, for a household receiving the dynastic utility associated with the static optimum,
c(w,q) provides less dependence of consumption on current output q than does the static
plan. For a household receiving the dynastic utility associated with the ex ante optimum,
c(w,q) provides more dependence of consumption on current output than does the ex ante
optimum.














Figure 2: The Consumption Function, c(w,q).
Neither of these characteristics is surprising. That the optimal stationary allocation
has less dependence of current consumption on current output comes entirely from the fact
that in the static optimum, all incentives must be provided through such dependence, while
the optimal stationary allocation allows for incentives to be provided through the function
w0(w,q) as well. That the optimal stationary allocation has more dependence of current
consumption on current output than does the ex ante optimal plan comes from the fact
that future generations matter more to society when ranking allocations by mean limiting
utility than by ex ante utility. Having a household’s consumption depend on its ancestors’
output costs society because utility is a convex function of consumption. However, such a
dependence helps relax the incentive constraints on parents (Theorem 1). The more future
generations enter the objective function of society, however, the costlier such intergenerational
dependence, and, thus, the less this manner of providing incentives is used.












Figure 3: The Utility Transition Function, w0(w,q).
Figure 3 presents the transition function w0(w,q). Like the function c(w,q), the func-
tion w0(w,q) is increasing in both arguments. The transition function w0(w,q) provides more
dependence of future dynastic utility on current output q than does the static optimum, since,
by deﬁnition, the static optimum allows for no such dependence. For a household receiving
the dynastic utility associated with the ex ante optimum, w0(w,q) provides less dependence
of future dynastic utility on current output than does the ex ante optimum, precisely because
c(w,q) is more sensitive to current output than is the ex ante optimum.
7. Concluding Remarks
The results here should generalize to environments other than unobserved eﬀort. The
idea that at perfect equality the marginal cost of unequal opportunity is second-order but
25the beneﬁts are ﬁrst-order appears quite general. The result on social mobility should hold
for any incentive model in which the resource cost of providing a mean dynastic utility is
strictly convex. For instance, an earlier version of this work proves Theorems 1 and 2 for
the taste shock model of Atkeson and Lucas (1992). While the need to provide incentives is
fundamental here, the particular source of the incentive problem is not. Technically, all that
is needed is a binding incentive constraint. With this, both unequal opportunity and social
mobility are necessary implications of an eﬃcient, or optimal, societal arrangement.
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288. Appendix
Proof. (Lemma 1): Suppose allocation ˜ ζ solves the primal problem but not the dual
problem. Allocation ˜ ζ is in the constraint set of the dual problem with cost S(˜ ζ) ≤ 0. Thus,
if it does not solve the dual problem, there exists another allocation ζ with a cost, S(ζ) < 0,











q P(qt|at(wt))[u−1(u(ct(wt,qt))+∆t)−qt]dΨt(w) = 0.
In words, ∆t is the constant utility addition (to allocation ζ) which causes the resource
constraint in period t to hold with equality. Next, let























and ˆ ct(wt,qt) be such that















deﬁnes an alternative feasible, incentive-compatible allocation ˆ ζ where the resource constraint
holds with equality at each date. (Note that for some t, St(ζ) may be positive (the resource
constraint (3) is violated), in which case this procedure reduces aggregate consumption, and
in others, St(ζ) is negative (the resource constraint (3) is slack), in which case this procedure
increases aggregate consumption.)





0 from S(ζ) < 0). Further, conditions (1), (2), and (3) are satisﬁed by ˆ ζ. Thus ˆ ζ is in the
constraint set of the primal problem, but has a higher primal objective function value than
˜ ζ, contradicting the optimality of ˜ ζ.
For Lemma 2, it is useful to let allocations be deﬁned as probabilistic. Let a probabilis-
tic allocation by deﬁned as a collection ζ = (Ψ0,{πt(·|wt)}∞
t=0), where πt(·|wt) is a probability
measure mapping subsets of A × Q × R+ × V to [0,1]. In words, πt(·|wt) gives the joint
probability of a household promised wt dynastic utils being recommended action at, realizing
output qt, receiving consumption level ct, and future utility promise wt+1 as in section 5. As
before, the measure Ψ0 and the functions πt deﬁne the sequence of measures over continuation
utilities {Ψt}∞
t=0 with means {vt}∞
t=0.
Proof. (Lemma 2): Suppose there exists ζ such that S(ζ) = S(ξ) −  for  > 0. Let
Eq =
P
q qP(q|a0) where a0 is the lowest eﬀort level and let v0 be the mean of Ψ0. Next, deﬁne
c0(w) such that w = (1−β)(u(c0(w))−v(a0))+βv0 and Dt(ζ) ≡
R
w c0(w)dΨt(w)−Eq−St(ζ).
In words, the function c0(w) is the consumption necessary to keep utility promise w, given
that from next period on the household will receive utility v0 and eﬀort is set to a0. The
function Dt(ζ) is the addition to the cost in period t of replacing the period t allocation
with an allocation that delivers Ψt with eﬀorts set to a0 and promises set to v0. Let D ≡
liminft→∞ Dt(ζ) and suppose D = ∞. This implies either St(ζ) → −∞, which contradicts
S(ζ) = 0, or
R
w c0(w)dΨt(w) → ∞. The latter implies either vt → −∞ or the variance of
Ψt → ∞, neither of which is compatible with optimality. Thus D < ∞.
Choose T such that 1
T+1
PT





ζ for dates t = 0 to T − 1, and let ζ
C for date T deliver ΨT with eﬀort set to a0, con-
30sumption levels set to c0(w) and promised utility be a lottery with measure Ψ0 indepen-
dent of wT and qT. For all t > T, repeat this T + 1 length cycle. By construction,
S(ζ
C) < S(ζ) + . Next, deﬁne the stationary allocation ξ = (Ψ,π) as follows. For all




t (W) and for all W ∈ B(V ), and Z ∈ B(A × Q × R+ × V ),
R











t (w) = 0, then π
can be deﬁned as anything.) This construction ensures
R







and thus the stationary allocation ξ delivers the same average utility as the cycle ζ
C. Sec-














t (w), and thus the stationary allocation ξ has the same cost as the cycle
ζ
C. Since S(ξ) < S(ζ)+ < S(ξ), the allocation ξ could not have solved the stationary dual
problem.
























. This ensures that the objective function
increases by . Next, let a(w + ) = a∗(w). This ensures that aggregate production is
unchanged. Finally, let w0(w + ,q) = w0∗(w,q) + , c(w + ,q) = c∗(w,q) if q 6= q, and
















31In words, a household promised w utils under allocation ξ
∗ is delivered w +  utils under
allocation ξ by increasing all continuation utility promises by  and increasing the utility




. This construction ensures that stationarity (4)
and promise-keeping (5) are maintained.
This leaves the incentive-compatibility constraints (6) and the resource-feasibility con-
dition (7) to be met. For a given utility point w +  and ˆ a < a, the incentive constraint for
allocation ξ is that

















From the fact that ξ



















where ∆ ≥ 0 is the amount by which the incentive constraint is slack. Subtracting, side by
side, expression (21) from expression (20) and using the deﬁnition of ξ delivers that





 + β − ∆.




< 1 and ∆ ≥ 0. Thus, ξ is incentive-compatible.








[c∗(w,q) − q]dΨ∗(w) < 0 implies that there
exists an  > 0 for which equation (7) is satisﬁed, contradicting the optimality of ξ
∗.




v+ for  > 0. Construct an alternative allocation exactly as in the previous paragraphs, but
32instead of adding consumption when output q occurs, subtract consumption when output q
occurs. This lowers both cost (the objective function of the stationary dual problem) and
mean utility (which is slack). Since  > 0, this contradicts the optimality of ξ
∗.
Proof. (Lemma 4): If ξ
∗ solves either the stationary primal or stationary dual problem, it
satisﬁes (4)–(6) immediately. Suppose ξ
∗ solves the stationary primal problem and another
stationary allocation ξ satisfying (4)–(6) and (9) has a negative value of the stationary dual
objective function (8). Such a plan is in the constraint set of the stationary primal problem
since it satisﬁes (4)–(6) immediately and satisﬁes (7) with slack. Stationary allocation ξ
has a weakly higher stationary primal objective function value (since it satisﬁes (9)) and the
resource constraint (7) does not bind, contradicting Lemma 3. Thus, if ξ
∗ solves the stationary
primal problem with objective value v, it solves the stationary primal problem with C(v) = 0.
Next, suppose a stationary allocation ξ
∗ solves the stationary dual problem with
C(v) = 0. Suppose another stationary allocation ξ satisfying (4)–(7) has
R
V wdΨ(w) > v.
Such a plan is in the constraint set of the stationary dual problem since it satisﬁes (4)–
(6) immediately and satisﬁes (9) with slack. Stationary allocation ξ has a weakly higher
stationary dual objective function value (since it satisﬁes (7)) and (9) does not bind, contra-
dicting Lemma 3. Thus , if ξ
∗ solves the stationary dual problem with C(v) = 0, it solves the
stationary primal problem with objective value v.






solve (11) subject to (4)–(6) and (9) for v = −1. Next, ﬁx ∆ > 0, and deﬁne ξ∆ by
scaling ξ−1 as follows: First, for all {w,w} ∈ R2
−, let Ψ∆([w,w]) = Ψ−1([w/∆, w/∆]). Next,
let a∆(w) = a−1(w/∆), c∆(w,q) = c−1(w/∆,q) − log(∆)/γ, and w0
∆(w,q) = w0
−1(w/∆,q)∆.
By construction, ξ∆ satisﬁes (4). Next, consider the incentive constraint for a given w < 0


























































which holds since ξ−1 is incentive-compatible, or satisﬁes (6). Next, conﬁrm the promise-




































= ∆w/∆ = w.






w ∆ dΨ−1(w) = ∆
Z
V
w dΨ−1(w) = −∆.
Thus, ξ∆ is in the constraint set of the dual problem for v = −∆. The resources consumed








































= −log(−v)/γ + C(1).
Next, suppose that there exists a plan ξ
∗ satisfying (4)–(6) and (9) for v = −∆,
which has resource cost C∗ < −log(−v)/γ + C(−1). Here, let δ = −1/∆, and deﬁne ξδ by
scaling ξ
∗ by δ as above. The same arguments as above establish that ξδ satisﬁes stationarity,



























































= log(−v)/γ + C
∗ < log(−v)/γ − log(−v)/γ + C(−1) = C(−1),
35which contradicts optimality of ξ−1.
Proof. (Lemma 6): The proof of Lemma 6 proceeds in the same way as that of Lemma
5. For γ > 0, ξ1 = {Ψ1,k1(w),a1(w),c1(w,q),w0
1(w,q)} is deﬁned as the optimal allocation
delivering v = 1. Then, for ∆ > 0, a new allocation ξ∆ is deﬁned such that for all [w,w] ∈ R2
+,
Ψ∆([w,w]) = Ψ1([w/∆, w/∆]), k∆(w) = k1(w/∆)∆1/γ, a∆(w) = a1(w/∆), c∆(w,q) =
c1(w/∆,q)∆1/γ, and w0
∆(w,q) = w0
1(w/∆,q)∆. I can show that ξ∆ is satisﬁed for (4)– (6)
and (9) for v = ∆. Further, if any other plan had a lower value for the dual objective
function (12), it could be used to generate a lower cost plan for delivering v = 1. Then
c∆(w,q) = c1(w/∆,q)∆1/γ, and v = ∆ delivers C(v) = v1/γC(1).
For γ < 0, ξ−1 = {Ψ−1,k−1(w),a−1(w),c−1(w,q),w0
−1(w,q)} is deﬁned as the optimal
allocation delivering v = −1. Then, for ∆ > 0, a new allocation ξ∆ is deﬁned such that for all
[w,w] ∈ R2
−, Ψ∆([w,w]) = Ψ−1([w/∆, w/∆]), k∆(w) = k−1(w/∆)∆1/γ, a∆(w) = a−1(w/∆),
c∆(w,q) = c−1(w/∆,q)∆1/γ, and w0
∆(w,q) = w0
−1(w/∆,q)∆, and the argument proceeds
unaltered. Then c∆(w,q) = c−1(w/∆,q)∆1/γ, and v = −∆ delivers C(v) = (−v)1/γC(−1).




, the reference allocation ξ0 =
{Ψ0,k0(w),a0(w),c0(w,q),w0
0(w,q)} is deﬁned as the optimal allocation delivering v = 0.
Then, for ∆ ∈ R, a new allocation ξ∆ is deﬁned such that for all [w,w] ∈ R2, Ψ∆([w,w]) =
Ψ0([w + ∆, w + ∆]), k∆(w) = k0(w − ∆)exp(∆), a∆(w) = a0(w − ∆), c∆(w,q) = c0(w −
∆,q)exp(∆), and w0
∆(w,q) = w0
0(w−∆,q)+∆, and the argument proceeds unaltered. Then
c∆(w,q) = c0(w − ∆,q)exp(∆), and v = ∆ delivers C(v) = exp(v)C(0).
36